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Eight Years with the Accounting Principles Board 
HOW IT FEELS TO BE A GORED OX 
By DONALD J. BEVIS / Retired Partner 
Risks and Rewards 
"My greatest experience in 40 years of public account ing/ ' says Donald Bevis, 
"was my tenure on the APB, from 1965 until the Board's demise in 1973, 
when it was succeeded by the Financial Accounting Standards Board." 
As a measure of his experience, he cites the number of Board 
pronouncements during that eight-year period: 
• 26 Opinions (Nos. 6 through 31) and approximately 200 Accounting 
Interpretations of these Opinions; 
• 3 Statements; 
• 7 Accounting Research Studies; 
• 19 Industry Audit and Accounting Guides. (The stated accounting pr in-
ciples and practices of these guides required the approval of the APB.) 
"Dur ing that per iod / ' he says, " I conversed wi th the most knowledgeable 
and capable accountants in the profession—in practice, industry, government, 
and the academe. These discussions, plus others with people in the 
financial community, greatly influenced my decisions on accounting issues. 
An initial conclusion was not necessarily the final one. I also learned to 
appreciate that there is more than one informed opinion on any accounting 
principle or its application. 
"Considering the fact that APB work was voluntary," he says, " i t was 
amazing to note the amount of t ime spent. For many members, including 
myself, it became almost a ful l-t ime duty: board meetings, committee 
meetings, night sessions, reams of correspondence, public hearings, draft 
pronouncements, and other activities. To this must be added the volunteered 
time of observers and advisers to Board members and those working on 
Industry Audit and Accounting Guides and Board-authorized research studies. 
In addit ion, one cannot overlook the time freely given by personnel 
of the SEC and other government bodies, together wi th the efforts of 
industry and accounting organizations, in developing information and 
commentary on proposed pronouncements. Finally, invaluable service was 
rendered by the AICPA staff. I would estimate that in the last several 
years, when the output was greatest, the annual cost was close to $2.5 mil l ion. 
This compares to a proposed annual cost of $3.5 mil l ion for the FASB." 
All of the material accumulated by the Board concerning its unfinished 
business has been made available to the FASB. These include Industry 
Audit and Accounting Guides and Accounting Research Studies in process. 
Some of the unfinished APB items are on the first priority list of FASB. 
Criticisms of the Board 
It is often said that the Accounting 
Principles Board did not deal wi th 
fundamental issues but spent too 
much t ime "put t ing out fires." I be-
lieve, however, that a rereading of 
the Opinions and Statements wi l l 
demonstrate that the APB did deal 
wi th many fundamental issues on ac-
counting principles and financial re-
porting.* 
Furthermore, because of the rap-
idly changing business and economic 
environment, it was necessary to put 
out fires, ignited in some cases by 
*Good examples are the Opinions on Accounting for 
Income Taxes, Reporting the Results of Operations, 
and The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments 
in Common Stock. 
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avant garde methods of " f ront load-
ing"—although a few flared up be-
yond the capacity of the fire depart-
ment to handle in a satisfactory man-
ner. The delay or failure in putt ing 
out some fires arose either from the 
need to obtain the required back-
ground information and reconcile 
different points of view before a 
sound pronouncement could be is-
sued, or because other items had a 
higher priority on the agenda. Even 
FASB, however, a completely ful l -
t ime organization dealing wi th fun-
damental issues on a more timely 
basis, wi l l still have to put out fires. 
Another complaint was that the 
Board did not deal directly wi th the 
objectives of financial statements 
and financial reporting. It was con-
tended the Board should have re-
solved this pervasive subject early in 
its history, in order that attempts at 
codification of proper accounting 
pr inc ip les w o u l d be p roduc t i ve . 
There is considerable validity to this 
criticism, but volunteer bodies can-
not always resolve issues as soon as 
the critics would like. FASB has the 
matter high on its agenda, and has 
released a discussion memorandum 
embodying the Trueblood Commit-
tee Report on "Objectives of Finan-
cial Statements." But we should not 
expect overnight implementation; 
after all, it took the Objectives Study 
Group two years to prepare its report 
issued in 1973. 
The Board lacked independence, 
according to some critics. It was sug-
gested that the individual members, 
and hence the Board itself, lacked 
independence because the members 
were subjected to pressures from 
clients of their firms. This was far 
from the truth. Each firm had clients 
who took opposite positions on many 
issues. Board members openly dis-
agreed wi th other partners in their 
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firms. Quite often the individual 
firms could not reach a unanimous 
pos i t ion on controvers ia l issues. 
Compromises were necessary. In my 
opinion, Board members sat down 
with objectivity and attempted to re-
solve all issues on their merits. Even 
though the Board acted wi th inde-
pendence, it may have lacked the ap-
pearance of independence, so crit i-
cal in obtaining public acceptance of 
its pronouncements. 
Pressures that did hurt the ac-
complishments of the Board arose 
from industry critics, letter-writing 
campaigns to Congressmen initiated 
by industry, lack of support at critical 
times by the SEC, and, in some cases, 
lack of support from fel low members 
of the practicing profession (e.g., a 
proposed amendment in 1969 to the 
Code of Professional Conduct, requir-
ing disclosure of departures from 
APB Opinions, narrowly failed to 
receive the necessary two-thirds af-
firmative votes). FASB, of course, 
can't be criticized for lack of inde-
pendence because its members are 
occupied ful l-t ime wi th their activi-
ties and have disassociated them-
selves from their former firms or em-
ployers. It remains to be seen what 
adverse actions may come from let-
ter-writ ing campaigns to Congress or 
from the SEC. 
In recent months the SEC has em-
phasized a distinction between ac-
coun t i ng disclosure ( " the i r prov-
ince") and accounting measurement 
(FASB responsibility). The distinction 
appears to be artificial and must be 
resolved if FASB is to accomplish its 
goals, and if the establishment of ac-
counting principles is to remain in 
the private sector. In this connection, 
it should be noted that on December 
20, 1973, in Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 150, the Commission reaf-
f irmed its long standing policy "o f 
looking to the private sector for lead-
ership in establishing and improving 
accounting principles and standards 
through the FASB, wi th the expecta-
t ion that the body's conclusions wi l l 
promote the interests of investors." 
The Board allegedly did not give 
adequate representation to issuers 
and users of financial statements in 
the determination of accounting 
principles; as an arm of the AICPA, 
it appeared to be both legislative and 
executive. Here again, there is some 
justification for this complaint. In the 
new FASB, however, both the re-
quirements for membership and the 
operating procedures provide for 
greater participation and input by 
issuers and users. But FASB must 
demonstrate that it can develop and 
maintain the legislative "c lou t " and 
prestige that wi l l be so necessary to 
avoid power conflicts between the 
interested groups. The APB lacked 
the prestige to minimize these con-
flicts. 
The APB did not always have ade-
quate research to support its conclu-
sions, critics said. This was true in 
some cases, but if the Board had 
waited because of the political sig-
nificance of some issues, it might 
well have resulted in " locking the 
barn after the horse was stolen." In 
the minds of many, issuance of the 
most-criticized Opinions did stop 
many of the abuses. In partial de-
fense of the APB, it should be noted 
that the discussions wi th industry and 
other organizations, public hearings, 
and the formal exposure process did 
not always elicit all the problem 
areas that had arisen or would arise 
if the proposed Opinion were to be 
issued. Responsibility for this arose 
through failure of some respondents 
to give adequate consideration to all 
sides of the subject matter. More 
often than not, on controversial is-
sues the name of the game was de-
structive criticism—not constructive 
criticism. Research was delayed in 
some cases because the time of the 
AICPA research staff was used to 
draft and revise proposed Opinions 
and Statements. 
There were two complaints which 
were completely opposite. Some 
contended that the Opinions dealt 
primarily wi th principles and did not 
state how they should be imple-
mented. Others contended that the 
Opinions were "cookbooks" ; they 
should have been limited to princi-
ples, leaving the application up to 
the judgment of issuers of financial 
statements and their auditors. Whi le 
some change in format might have 
been made, the Board believed that 
in highly technical and controversial 
issues it was necessary to go into 
considerable detail to avoid misap-
plication of its conclusions. In other 
cases where the conclusions were 
quite clear, the Board did not believe 
it was necessary to prescribe the 
bookkeeping. 
Finally, the critics say the Board, 
which included the author of this ar-
ticle, accepted too many compro-
mise positions. In a democracy, you 
must reconcile different points of 
view if progress is to be achieved. 
Politics also has a role in establishing 
accounting principles. Some progress 
is always better than none. Apropos 
of th i s c o m p l a i n t , some c r i t i c s 
said, if Opinions of the APB were 
compromises, why did some mem-
bers qualify their assent or dissent. It 
must be remembered that the adop-
t ion of Op in ions requ i red a t w o -
thirds favorable vote on the issues. 
The APB did not operate in an atmos-
phere of dissent. But even wi th com-
promises, some members still quali-
fied their assents or dissents because 
they could not agree on all parts of 
the solution that had been reached. 
Strengths of the Board 
The strengths of the Board have been 
mentioned above. In summary, they 
were: 
7. Accounting expertise. Members 
of the Board were some of the most 
knowledgeable and capable accoun-
tants in the country. All had direct 
contacts wi th many other experts on 
specific issues. 
2. Dedication. Although service on 
the APB was voluntary, its members 
were dedicated to the determination 
of sound accounting principles. Avail-
ability of t ime was not a major l imit-
ing factor. 
3. Integrity. Board members main-
ta ined thei r independence at all 
times. They only changed their con-
clusions when the weight of evidence 
and support was against them. 
4. Objectivity. Board members ap-
proached all issues on the basis of 
their merits. They were not influ-
enced by unsupported special inter-
ests and so-called "populari ty con-
tests." Compromises were necessary 
to reconcile strong opposing points 
of view. 
Weaknesses of the Board 
For equal t ime, I wi l l summarize the 
weaknesses of the Board. They were: 
1. It was not a ful l-t ime body and 
lacked the time and resources to re-
solve some important issues. 
2. It did not establish the objec-
tives of f inancia l statements and 
financial reporting. 
3. The input from issuers and users 
of financial statements was inade-
quate in some cases. 
4. Research, both basic and ap-
plied, was lacking in some cases. 
The Beginning of the End 
By 1969, the Board had gained con-
siderable public respect and stature, 
although it had not accomplished as 
much as some people expected. (It 
was established in September 1959, 
when it assumed the responsibilities 
of the fo rmer commi t tees on ac-
counting procedure and on termi-
nology.) It had overcome the crit i-
cisms growing out of the "investment 
credit" fiasco, a situation that almost 
resulted in the death of the APB— 
which is perhaps worth going into 
here. 
In December 1962, the APB issued 
its Opinion No. 2, Accounting for 
the "Investment Credit," concluding 
"that the allowable investment credit 
should be reflected in net income 
over the productive life of acquired 
property and not in the year in which 
it is placed in service." Some ac-
countants and businessmen refused 
to abide by the Opin ion, and the SEC 
backed down in 1963 from its initial 
support, wi th the result that the APB 
was forced to amend the Opinion. 
Opinion No. 4 (March 1964) permits 
treating the credit as a reduction of 
federal income taxes of the year in 
which the credit arises, or spreading 
it over the productive life of the re-
lated property. 
In mid-1967, in the exposure draft 
of Opinion No. 11 , Accounting for 
Income Taxes, the APB again tried to 
establish that there was only one way 
to account for investment tax credits 
—they should be reflected in income 
over the life of the related assets. 
Again, some accountants and busi-
nessmen and the SEC refused to sup-
port the conclusion, and the subject 
was dropped from the Opinion. 
In 1969 the Board began a re-ex-
amination of Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 48, Business Combina-
tions (issued in January 1957). The 
application of this bul let in, wi th the 
acquiescence of the SEC, became so 
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watered down that there was no log-
ical standard for accounting for busi-
ness combina t ions . Clamor arose 
from all sides for its revision and the 
stopping of abuses practiced under 
the guise of generally accepted ac-
counting principles. 
The APB's initial position would 
have barred pooling-of-interests ac-
counting. Intense pressures on the 
Board were exerted by the profes-
sion and by industry in this highly 
emotional and controversial issue. 
The Board foundered. It backed away 
step-by-step from what many consid-
ered to be the most important cri-
t e r i on , if poo l ing-o f - in teres ts ac-
counting was to be permitted (from 
a 3 to 1 size test, to a 9 to 1 size test, 
and then to no size test). But some-
thing had been done; a weak Opin-
ion (but not as weak as the one be-
fore) was issued in August 1970 
(Opinion No. 16—Business Combina-
tions). There was, however, general 
dissatisfaction wi th the result. The 
" q u a l i t y of earn ings" of a post-
merger company was still suspect. 
From this point forward there was a 
d is t inc t loss of con f idence in the 
Board. It had yielded to pressures. 
Shortly thereafter, the American 
Accounting Association, the academ-
ics' organization, appointed a com-
mittee to look into the establishment 
of general ly accepted account ing 
principles. That committee discon-
tinued its activities when the AICPA, 
early in 1971, appointed two com-
mittees—the Study Group on Estab-
lishment of Accounting Principles 
and the Study Group on the Objec-
tives of Financial Statements. 
The same year, 1971, also saw sev-
eral other events and debacles which 
had a deleterious impact on the ef-
fectiveness and activities of the APB. 
Congress, at the request of some 
businessmen and professional ac-
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countants, and despite strong sup-
port of the APB position (the same as 
in 1967) by the SEC, specified in law 
how to account for the investment 
credit. The options permitted under 
Opinion No. 4 were continued. 
In 1968, the Board had begun an 
intensive study on account ing for 
marketable securities. By 1971, it was 
prepared to issue an exposure draft 
which would have required carrying 
such securities in the balance sheet 
at current market values and reflect-
ing the unrealized gains or losses in 
current income. The insurance indus-
try objected. Other proposals were 
suggested but there were always 
strong ob jec t ions f rom in f luent ia l 
sources. The SEC did not support the 
APB; the matter died. 
Other blows to the Board soon fo l -
lowed. For several years it had been 
considering accounting in the extrac-
tive industries. However, the Federal 
Power Commission issued a regula-
t ion requiring " fu l l cost" accounting 
by natural gas pipeline companies. 
This occurred despite a request from 
the Board to hold up any regulation 
until the Board had completed its 
study. 
Accounting for leases was also high 
on the agenda of the APB. Prelimi-
nary discussions had been held wi th 
interested parties but no conclusions 
had been reached. However, in an at-
tempt to forestall any requirements 
for capitalization of leases, lobbying 
in Congress began. It was contended 
that any such requirement would se-
riously disrupt a major factor in the 
economy of the country. Resolution 
of t he issue by t he Board was 
dropped. 
By the end of 1971, the ;demise of 
the Board was clearly predictable. 
The Board had not been able to cope 
with the environment in which it op-
erated. Public trust had not been es-
tablished. The ox had been gored. 
What Did the APB Accomplish? 
The Board believed that financial ac-
counting could be made a rational 
discipline, but it was faced wi th both 
intellectual and political problems. 
Despite these problems, the Board 
did make considerable progress in 
improving financial reporting: 
1. Financial account ing , i t said, 
should recognize the economic sub-
stance of events or transactions, even 
though the legal form differs. 
2. Improved disclosures in report-
ing were required. 
3. Areas of difference in account-
ing and reporting were narrowed. 
4. Recognition of "current value" 
accounting in contrast to historical 
cost accounting received increasing 
attention. 
5. "Front loading" of income was 
severely restricted. 
Good Opinions 
The Opinions briefly discussed be-
low provide some evidence of the 
accomplishments of the APB. 
No. 8—Accounting for the Cost of 
Pension Plans (November 1966). This 
Opinion states that the establishment 
of a pension plan implies a long-term 
undertaking, and that, accordingly, 
pension costs should be recognized 
annually, even though there may be 
legal limitations. The Opinion needs 
updating in view of experiences in 
the past eight years, new develop-
ments in pension plans, and recently 
enacted legislation. 
No. 9 — Reporting the Results of 
Operations (December 1966). This 
Opinion established that the "a l l - in-
clusive" concept should be fol lowed 
in income reporting, rather than the 
" cu r ren t opera t ing pe r fo rmance " 
concept. Direct entries of profit and 
loss items to retained earnings were 
ruled out. 
No. 11 — Accounting for Income 
Taxes (December 7967).This Opin ion 
required comprehensive interperiod 
tax allocation in the determination of 
income tax expense, even though 
there was no legal liability at the 
time. In my opinion, the question of 
the use of the "deferred method / ' 
instead of the " l i a b i l i t y m e t h o d , " 
should now be reconsidered. Further, 
the accounting for income taxes in 
special areas (see APB Opinion No. 
23) needs re-examination. There can 
be only one proper method of ac-
counting for incentive tax credits and 
that matter should also be covered 
in any revision. 
No. 18—The Equity Method of Ac-
counting for Investments in Common 
Stock (March 1971). This Opinion re-
quires the application of the equity 
method of accounting for certain in-
vestments in common stock that are 
50 percent or less of the voting power 
— in order to give some recognition 
to their changing value. 
No. 19—Reporting Changes in Fi-
nancial Position (March 1971). This 
Opinion requires the inclusion of a 
statement of changes in financial po-
sition as a basic financial statement. 
No. 20—Accounting Changes (July 
1971). This Opinion eliminated the 
areas of difference in reporting ac-
counting changes. 
No. 21 — Interest on Receivables 
and Payables (August 1971). This 
Opinion requires the imputation of 
interest when the face amount of the 
obl igat ion does not represent the 
present value of the consideration 
given or received in the exchange. 
No. 22 —Disclosure of Accounting 
Policies (April 1972). As the title in-
dicates, this Opinion requires the dis-
closure of all significant accounting 
policies. 
No. 28—Interim Financial Report-
ing (May 1973). This Opin ion extends 
the app l i cab i l i t y of general ly ac-
cepted accounting principles to in-
terim financial reporting. 
No. 29—Accounting for Non-mon-
etary Transactions (May 1973). This 
Opinion narrowed the areas of differ-
ence in accounting for such transac-
tions. 
No. 30—Reporting the Results of 
Operations (June 1973). This Opinion 
eliminated areas of difference, and es-
tablished more definitive disclosure 
requirements in reporting on certain 
events and transactions. The Opinion 
was also needed to stop the rapidly 
deve lop ing pract ice of record ing 
debits to income from unusual trans-
actions as extraordinary items, and 
credits to income from such transac-
tions as ordinary items. 
Poor Opinions 
No. 4—Accounting for the /ylnvest-
ment Credit'—amending APB Opin-
ion No. 2 (March 1964). No th ing 
further need be said about Opinion 
No. 4. The events surrounding it al-
most disrupted any progress in ac-
counting. 
No. 5—Reporting of Leases in Fi-
nancial Statements of Lessee (Sep-
tember 1964). The Opinion provided 
that leases should be capitalized if 
the terms of the lease resulted " i n the 
creation of a material equity in the 
property." However, the definit ion 
of creation of a material equity was 
inconclusive and little good came 
from the Opin ion. 
No. 14—Accounting for Convert-
ible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock 
Purchase Warrants (March 1969). In 
APB Opinion No. 10, the Board stated 
wi th considerable logic that the por-
t ion of the proceeds attributable to 
the conversion feature of convert-
ible debt should be accounted for as 
paid-in capital. This action was re-
versed in No. 14 because of the "pur-
por ted" inseparability of the debt 
and the conversion opt ion, and be-
cause of the difficulties of implemen-
tation. The conclusion led to other 
nonsequiturs, like the requirement 
in No. 26, Early Extinguishment of 
Debt, that any gain or loss on the ex-
t ingu ishment of conver t ib le debt 
should be recognized in income and 
cannot be an adjustment of capital. 
No. 16—Business Combinations 
(August 1970). The history and results 
of issuance of this Opinion have al-
ready been referred to. 
Other Opinions 
One other Opinion deserves some 
comment. No. 15—Earnings PerShare 
(May 1969). This has been criticized 
because of its internal complexi ty 
and arbitrary rules. Further, over 100 
interpretations of the Opin ion were 
subsequently issued. Nevertheless, in 
v iew of the business envi ronment 
and the emphasis on earnings per 
share at the t ime, it was essential that 
the Board take some stand on the 
subject. Uniformity in practice had 
to be established. 
Conclusion 
Obviously, I hope the FASB wi l l learn 
from the experience of the APB. The 
APB started wi th great expectations. 
The FASB wi l l need the support of all 
interested parties if it is to succeed. 
Bitter and acrimonious debate must 
yield to objectivity and constructive 
cooperation. The espousal of per-
sonal interests must be secondary. 
On a personal note, the benefits of 
eight years wi th the Accounting Prin-
ciples Board cannot be evaluated. 
There is no way to assign a dollar 
value to the education I received, to 
the many new friendships created, 
and more importantly to the contri-
butions of many to the development 
of sound accounting practices. The 
Board rests—in peace. & 
